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Distinguished Guest Lecture 
Markets as Information Gathering Tools 
Charles R. Plott* 
The academic literature, Wall Street commentary, and even daily news reporting reflect a
belief that markets can anticipate events. The current movements in the stock market are inter- 
preted as reflecting the likelihood that the Federal Reserve System will change interest rates. 
Futures markets are interpreted as reflecting the best estimates of things to come. Movements 
in individual stock prices are thought to anticipate earnings reports or the probability of a merger 
or buyout. If we want to know about future weather in the South, we should study the orange 
juice futures. The academic journals are filled with the concept of rational expectations in which 
current prices are supposed to reflect he sum of all knowledge in the system. Prices, according 
to this theory, are a statistic that indicates the aggregation of information about underlying states 
of the economy. Those who are "outsiders" to the information i the system become "insiders" 
by simply observing the economic activity. 
While such beliefs are pervasive, there is a need to pause and ask ourselves what it means 
for markets to have such capacities. First, it means that markets can find the solution to a 
complex set of equations that are part of the knowledge of no one. Second, it means that while 
finding this solution, it can collect information that is dispersed across the economy, aggregate 
it like a statistician, and publish the findings in the form of the prices. 
Why do the commonly held notions imply such complexity? According to received theory, 
an economy is best described as a large set of nonlinear, simultaneous equations. Equilibrium 
is just a solution to the set, the "zeros" so to speak. Of course, no one knows what these 
equations are since the information that forms the equations is typically known only to the 
individual agents in the economy. Thus, the information about the equations is not in one head, 
but there is even more information that must be collected. Each individual has private infor- 
mation about the world around him. Expectations based on this private information are sufficient 
for decisions so long as such expectations are not inconsistent with other information reflected 
in the behavior of the economy, such as prices. If prices or other variables contain additional 
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information, the behavior of the individual will change, pushing the system to a different form 
of equilibrium. Equilibration will not occur until all information is comfortably incorporated in 
the publicly observable variables. When the additional information property is added, the com- 
putation is challenging indeed. Even if the equations were known to individuals, finding a 
solution (in finite time) might be very challenging to even the most numerically inclined applied 
mathematician. 
On the surface, the idea that narkets can perform such aggregation seems to be false. It 
seems to be beyond human capacities. One is tempted to dismiss the theory immediately, 
without further thought. However, such dismissal would be premature. The capacities to infer 
underlying information from the behavior of others is so commonplace that we hardly notice 
the complex process that is taking place. When searching for a restaurant inan unfamiliar area, 
people typically look to see where many others are eating. If one stands and looks into a store 
window, those passing on the sidewalk will frequently pause to look also. When judging the 
quality of movies, both the number of favorable reviews as well as the reported ticket sales 
figure into an otherwise uninformed decision. The odds at horse races or the Las Vegas point 
spreads on ball games are frequently good predictors of winners. In fact, when these variables 
are used in models, they leave very little for other variables to explain. The odds and point 
spreads are not made by a single mind but instead are the product of many interdependent minds 
competing for an advantage. These examples illustrate the ability of humans to infer subtle 
information from systemic properties and suggest that such inferences might be commonplace. 
In fact, it might not be limited to humans, as will be the testimony of any fisherman who uses 
the movements of birds to locate fish. 
The theory goes much further than the casual observations of the examples and makes 
rather precise, quantitative claims that are in need of investigation. That issue forms the topic 
of this talk. Can markets perform the tasks as advertised? Can markets find the zeros? If so, 
how do they do it? Can markets collect and aggregate information? Ifmarkets can do these 
things, what might be the uses? After all, the capacity to harness such powerful tendencies 
might be something of value. In addition to these topics there is another issue, which is the 
substance of the talk. How can we answer the above questions? The answer to the substantive 
issue is the use of laboratory experimental methods. 
In posing the topics, a perspective is in order. The question is whether markets can do it 
at all, as opposed to whether they can always do it. Are such properties within the capacities 
of humans and organized markets? We want to establish only the possibility, a proof of principle. 
Whether markets can always do it and/or the full range of capacities to do it is far beyond the 
scope of what is known. 
1. Systems of Equations 
Can Markets Solve Them? 
Two examples will be explored. Consider first a simple case, which turns out to not be 
simple at all: a laboratory setting in which each individual is given a "redemption value" and 
a time interval in which that redemption value is valid. The redemption value is of the form 
R,(x,, T), where xi is the quantity of some specific ommodity purchased, T is a time interval, 
and R,(., .) is the amount that the subject can collect from the experimenter f om holdings of 
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an amount xi. Literally, the subject buys units in the market and resells them to the experimenter 
at prices reflected in the function Ri(xi, T) as long as the subject resells in the time interval T. 
Thus, the income to the subject from purchases in the quantity x is 
Ri(xi, T) - [cost of purchases of xi], (1) 
where the cost of purchases of xi is the sum of the prices paid for the units that make the total 
quantity xi. 
If prices were fixed at some level P, then the theory of consumer choice asserts that each 
individual, i, will attempt to solve the equation: 
Ri(xi, T)/lx, - P = 0. (2) 
When inverted, Equation 2 yields the equation 
xi = Di(P, T). (3) 
Sellers in the market can buy from the experimenter according to a cost function Cj(yj, T), 
where the individual is j and the number of units purchased from the experimenter during the 
time interval T is yj. The income from the experiment is 
[Revenue from sales of yj] - Cj(yj, T). (4) 
If prices are fixed at P, then Equation 4 becomes 
Pyj - Cj(yj, T) (5) 
and according to theory, the individual solves the equation 
P - 3CJ(yJ, T)/yj1 = 0, (6) 
producing supply functions of the form 
yj = S(P, T). (7) 
The law of supply and demand represents another equation of the form 
E Xi- E Yj = 0. (8) 
Notice the complexity of this model. If there are n people, then Equations 3, 7, and 8 
represent n + 1 equations, without considering the complexity introduced by the variable T. 
The equations are nonlinear, and no one in the system knows them all. Indeed, no one in the 
system knows more than one of them. Furthermore, the solution is found under most unusual 
circumstances because typically there is no single price in a market. There are many prices 
because of the nature of bids, asks, and contracts. 
Can markets olve such a complex system? Figure 1 illustrates the fact that the answer is 
"yes." In the market represented in the figure, there were 87 people, approximately half of 
whom were buyers and half sellers. Shown there is the time series from a market created much 
like the one described above, only the time, T, is more complicated.1 It is also more complicated 
'In this market, the incentive functions "overlapped" in the sense that the time periods of incentives overlapped. For 
example, the T for one group of subjects was from, say, 1:00 to 2:00, with a new set of incentives arriving at 2:00 and 
lasting for an hour. The T for another group started at, say, 1:30 and was good to 2:30, and so on. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 17:18:04 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Distinguished Guest Lecture 5 
Price 
250 
I I 
200 I I -___- - - - - - - - - ,
I I ?15 ~--;--~--~----?-- I--~;------~---i------- 
100 
I I 
50 
I I 
0 
0 0.5 1 1.5 
Hours 98012 
Figure 1. Price Convergence to the Equilibrium of the Competitive Model 
because these people could speculate. They could buy and resell for a profit; thus, the nature 
of the interactions is extremely complex, suggesting that there are many more equations needed 
to solve the system than the 88 suggested by theory. Yet, as can be seen in the figure, the price- 
time path converges to the competitive quilibrium, the dotted line. When the competitive 
equilibrium is shifted, the markets adjust to the new equilibrium. By observing the time series 
alone, one knows the solution to this complex set of equations even without going through the 
complex set of computations. 
To those who have observed this phenomena demonstrated many times in experimental 
markets, the discussion above is not particularly surprising. For those who have not, a natural 
suspicion is that the ability of markets to perform this complex function is somehow related to 
the fact that only one market is in operation and that the major interdependencies that might 
exist in an economy would change the result. It is well known that when time is involved and 
the commodity traded has the form of an asset, bubbles can occur (Smith, Suchanek, and 
Williams 1988; King et al. 1993; Van Boening, Williams, and LeMaster 1993; Porter and Smith 
1994, 1995; Fisher and Kelly 2000; Lei, Noussair, and Plott, in press). The surprising thing is 
that when the economy is complicated in the natural way, the result remains the same. The 
economy can still "compute" the equilibrium (Goodfellow and Plott 1990; Sunder 1992, 1995; 
Noussair, Plott, and Riezman 1995, 1997; Lian and Plott 1998). 
As an example, consider a general equilibrium experiment conducted over the Internet. 
The experiment includes resources, X and Y, that were supplied with disutility (such as labor), 
production functions that used the two inputs in a nonlinear way to produce an output, Z. The 
demand for Z and final consumption depended on the income of the buyer from resource sales. 
Notice that since production functions were used, the underlying marginal cost of supply de- 
pended on the ability of the system to achieve a least-cost combination of resources by every 
producer. Thus, output cost became a variable to be determined by the market. The system was 
closed with the introduction ofa fiat money and by making consumers of Z and suppliers of 
resources X and Y the same agent. Thus, in order to get fiat money to buy, the subjects had to 
supply a resource and sell it. The resource could be supplied only at a "disutility" cost to the 
subject represented by U.S. dollars. It was sold for fiat, which was then used to buy the output 
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Figure 2. Relative Prices Converge to the Predictions of the General Competitive Equilibrium Model 
Z, which could be "consumed" to gain utility represented by a sale to the experimenter for 
U.S. dollars. Of course, at the close of the experiment, fiat would be worthless. To overcome 
this, the experimenter opened the markets again, after the close of the experiment, and sold the 
outputs valued by subjects at the franc prices that had existed some periods in the past before 
the end of the experiment was announced. 
Since the economy was cash in advance, cash flow presented possible problems. To over- 
come this, a type of "bond" was introduced. Each bond was worth a 50-50 chance at $0.50 or 
nothing after the experiment was over. Bonds were bought and sold for fiat. Thus, if fiat cash 
balances were too large, bonds could be purchased as a store of wealth. If cash balances were 
too low, bonds could be sold to get the fiat needed for trading. 
In order to illustrate the technical features of these experiments, the parameters are listed 
in a footnote,2 and the data are shown in Figure 2. As can be seen in the figure, the data have 
substantial variance, which is probably related to the relatively thin markets and the long time 
of the experiment. Nevertheless, the means of prices are close to the competitive equilibrium, 
which is really remarkable given that the supply depends on the optimal combination of re- 
sources and equilibrium input prices.3 The rapid increase in prices exhibited near the middle of 
2 Utility functions of the two different types of agents are of the form: 100Z - 9X - 2X2 - 32Y - 5/2Y2; 100Z - 9X 
- 2X2 - 30Y - 5/2Y2. Of course, Z is the consumption good, and X and Y are the resources that are supplied causing 
disutility to the supplier. Production functions of the two different types of producing agents were of the form Z = 2XIY'13; 
Z = 2.3X1/3 y1/2. Producers also had a utility from consuming X and Y such that they would want to buy one unit of 
Y for consumption purposes at competitive equilibrium prices and spend the rest of their profits on the consumption of 
X. Each agent had an initial endowment of 300 francs (fiat) cash and also 10 bonds, each of which represented a lottery 
with a 50-50 chance between 50 cents or nothing. 
3 If the estimates of the price of X near the end of the experiment are on the order of 115, then the price of Y, which is 
1.3 times the price of X in the competitive equilibrium, should be about 150. The price of Z is 1.9 times the price of 
X in the competitive equilibrium, so the price of Z should be about 218. A reasonable representation of the data is that 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 17:18:04 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Distinguished Guest Lecture 7 
500 500 
450 - D 1 450 -D2 
S400 - upply Supply 400 400 
350 350 
300 300 
250 250 
200 200 
150 - - - - - - - - - ---- ---- 
100 100 
50- ------ - - - 
0 0 
0 50 100 150 0 50 100 150 
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the experiment is the result of an unexpected increase in the money supply. The money supply 
was increased by the experimenter through an application of the experimental version of open 
market operations in which the experimenter bought heavily in the bond market using a reserve 
of fiat and thereby increasing the amount of fiat in circulation. 
Thus, we see here that markets can find the solution to an extremely complex set of 
equations. The solution is not as accurate as a mathematical derivation from theory, but the 
approximate accuracy is striking. Depending on how one counts, with the 32 subjects, standard 
theory amounts to over 100 equations that must be solved. As an exercise, the interested reader 
should try to solve them. 
the price of X near the end of the experiment is 115, the price of Y is somewhere over 130, and the price of Z seems 
to be in the 210-220 range. The price of bonds is one-half the price of X in the competitive equilibrium. Of course, 
absolute prices are not predictable given the current development of the theory of general equilibrium. The money 
supply was doubled at about 18 to 19 hours into the experiment. It is easy to see that he system responded, but whether 
velocity of circulation is constant and the price levels will double as a result remains an open question. 
450 
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* 250 
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Figure 4. Price Convergence to the Walrasian Stable Equilibrium (blue) as Opposed to the Marshallian Stable Equilibrium 
(green) With and Without Price Ceilings (yellow) 
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What Is the Process? Can Markets Find All the Solutions? 
How does the market find a solution to such a complex problem? What happens if multiple 
solutions exist? Complex systems of nonlinear equations can have multiple solutions. If many 
solutions exist to the market equations, does the method of solution allow it to find all of them? 
While the exact method by which information gets into the market is unknown, it is clear 
that "local" activities are important (Friedman 1991; Cason and Friedman 1993, 1996; Easley 
and Ledyard 1993; Gode and Sunder 1993, 1997; Gjerstad and Dickhaut 1995; Turocy and Plott 
1996; Jamison and Plott 1997; Brewer et al. 1999). Markets have a tendency to converge and 
the nature of the convergence process is heavily influenced by the conditions of demand and 
supply near the neighborhood of the price and allocation. The clearest view of this phenomena 
comes from experiments that deal with the possibility that markets can exhibit properties of 
stability and instability. 
Figure 3 illustrates stability and instability in the case of a backward-bending supply of a 
resource, which could be interpreted as the backward-bending supply of labor. Shown on the 
left are the demand and supply parameters under the assumption of competitive markets. By 
changing the shape of the demand curve from D, to D2, the stability properties of an equilibrium 
can be changed from stable to unstable. When the demand is D,, points A and B are stable and 
unstable, respectively. When the demand is D2, points A and B are unstable and stable, respec- 
tively. The shift from one demand to the other during an experiment is part of the experimental 
design. The blue lines are stable according to the Walrasian model of dynamic adjustments, and 
the green lines are the unstable equilibria ccording to that theory.4 By allowing the markets to 
adjust under conditions of multiple quilibria, the experiments explore whether the markets will 
adjust to an unstable equilibrium, and by making an equilibrium unstable after the market has 
adjusted, the experiment determines the nature of the adjustment laws. 
The data from the experiment presented in Figure 4 are typical of patterns of results in 
general (Plott 2000). As can be seen, the data first converge to a stable equilibrium. When the 
equilibrium becomes unstable because of a demand shift, the data quickly move away from the 
equilibrium toward a stable equilibrium. A price ceiling imposed just below the unstable equi- 
librium, without changing the demand or supply, results in prices that fall to the stable equilib- 
rium below. Thus, even when the data are forced to be near the unstable equilibrium, the market 
moves away. If an equilibrium is unstable, it will not be "found" by the market. 
The experiments tell us that the answer to the first question of how the markets olve the 
equation is related to the adjustment process. The method of solution is hidden in some complex 
process of dynamic adjustments. Can the market find all the solutions? The answer to this 
second question is "no," markets cannot find all the solutions. This process of adjustments is 
such that some equilibria are unstable and thus will never be approached or found. Market 
forces will not lead to a configuration fprices and allocations that exist at an unstable qui- 
librium. 
4 Two theories have been prominent in the literature over the last century. One was developed by Walras, and the other 
was developed by Marshall. Under certain conditions, the two theories are diametrically opposed. As it turns out, which 
theory is correct depends on the underlying economy and the reason for the "perverse"-shaped curves. Walrasian 
stability is appropriate in the case of income effects, but Marshallian stability is appropriate in the case of externalities 
(Plott and Smith 1999). 
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2. Information Aggregation 
Can Markets Collect and Broadcast Information? 
Figure 5 can be used to address this question. The experiment is a replication of a design 
found in Camerer and Weigelt (1991). Consider an economy in which there is a single asset 
that pays according to which of two states that nature has chosen. All agents are endowed with 
units, and the economy proceeds in a series of days, or "periods," in which each agent is 
endowed with a number of one-period securities. Information about the state may be distributed 
and trade takes place, and after the period ends the state of nature is announced, the dividend 
is paid, and the securities are discarded. The dividends are 200 if the state is Y and 400 if the 
state is X with probabilities 0.75 and 0.25, respectively. 
Before the trading begins, inside information is distributed. Each agent receives a slip of 
paper that is either blank or contains the true state. A 50-50 random event determines whether 
insiders will exist. If insiders do not exist, then the papers distributed to all agents are blank. 
If the random event designates that insiders will exist, then a small number of agents are given 
accurate information about the state. Thus, if there are insiders, the insiders themselves know 
that insiders exist, and they know the state, but those who are not insiders do not know whether 
insiders exist. If there are no insiders, then no one knows whether insiders exist. 
A theoretical exercise will help explain the ideas. If the state is X, and if everyone knows 
that the state is X, then the price of the security will be 400. If the state is Y and if everyone 
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knows that the state is Y, then the price of the security will be 200. If there are no insiders and 
if everyone knows that there are no insiders, then the price of the security will be the expected 
value of 250, neglecting any discount for risk aversion. 
The time series of prices of an experiment are shown in Figure 5. As can be seen, the 
prices typically adjust rapidly to the equilibrium price as if everyone knew whether there are 
insiders and as if everyone knew the state. That is, in period 1 there are insiders who know 
that the state is X and the prices adjust to near 400. In period 2 there are insiders who know 
that the state is Y and the prices adjust to near 200. In period 3 there are no insiders and no 
one knows that there are no insiders. The price adjusts to near 250. A major exception is period 
11, which will be discussed later. 
Is the information aggregated? The answer to that can be tested by the reader. If you are 
able to determine the state by looking at the time series and without looking at the key at the 
bottom of the figure, then the answer to the question is "yes." The reader is not an insider, yet 
from observing the data, knowledge of the state emerges. 
Can the market be wrong? Period 11 is of special interest because it is an instance in 
which the market clearly came to the wrong answer. The market suggests that an insider exists 
who knows that the state is the high-dividend state, but in reality there were no insiders at all. 
Had the situation of no insiders been public information, then the price would have been 250. 
Thus, markets have the capacity to collect information a d publish it, but that capacity is not 
perfect. The market can make mistakes. Camerer and Weigelt (1991) call such mistakes "mi- 
rages." 
Can Markets Aggregate Information? 
The result above demonstrates that markets can collect information a d publish it but can 
make mistakes. That leaves open the question of whether markets can perform the additional 
function of aggregating information a d whether the capacity of markets to perform this function 
can be improved. The issue has received some attention i  the literature. The original discovery 
is found in Plott and Sunder (1982, 1988), and an impressive literature has developed since 
(Copeland and Friedman 1987, 1991, 1992; Forsythe and Lundholm 1990; Sunder 1992, 1995; 
N6th and Weber 1996). It is known that certain circumstances will not result in success (Kagel 
and Levin 1986; Dyer, Kagel, and Levin 1989; Lind and Plott 1991; Anderson and Holt 1997). 
The answer to both questions is "yes," as the following experiments will demonstrate. 
Consider the following experiment. The economy consists of 10 states, and each individual 
has only a small amount of private information about the true state. However, because of the 
large number of agents, each with independently drawn information, much information exists 
in the system. While each individual knows very little, the "market knows" the state with 
almost certainty. The question to be posed is whether the information will become aggregated 
when individuals compete in a complete set of state-contingent commodities. This will test the 
robustness of the result originally reported by Plott and Sunder (1988), in which a complete set 
of markets uccessfully aggregated information when a single market could not. 
The experiments are developed as follows. The markets were conducted on the Marketscape 
software with subjects located at home, in their dorm rooms, or in one of the local laboratories. 
The possible states of nature are labeled by 10 letters of the alphabet. For each of these letters 
a certificate with a one period life is created. That is, there is a Q certificate raded in the Q 
market, an R certificate raded in the R market, and so on. The certificate hat corresponds to 
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the letter chosen as the state pays a 200 dividend, and all other certificates pay nothing. Each 
individual is given an initial endowment of 10 certificates tocreate a 10-dimensional exchange 
economy. Endowments are refreshed, and a new drawing of a state occurs each period. Thus, 
if the state is known, the certificate corresponding to the state has a competitive equilibrium 
price of 200, and all others have a competitive equilibrium price of 0. 
The experiments proceed in a series of independent periods, and before each period the 
subjects are given private information about the state in the upcoming period. No communi- 
cation or sharing of private information is allowed." Trading takes place in the context of much 
individual uncertainty as each person gets very little information-a sample of three independent 
draws from a distribution i which the true state is drawn with probability 0.25 and each of the 
nine others with a probability V12. For example, if the sample for a subject contains three 
different s ates, each of those three states has a posterior probability of .188, and all others have 
a posterior probability of about 0.06. If the signal is "strong," with the same state drawn all 
three times, then the subject could associate the state with a 0.75 probability.6 
The pattern of results can be most easily understood from the example of one experiment. 
The time series of prices for each market are shown in Figure 6. This experiment operated with 
approximately 90 subjects. Thus, even though each individual had very little information, the 
"market," consisting of the aggregate of about 270 observations, three from each of 90 people, 
had a great deal of information. I other words, the market "knew" the state with near certainty. 
As can be seen in Figure 6, the information aggregation occurs. According to the infor- 
mation aggregation hypothesis of rational expectations, the prices should reflect all available 
5 Methods for controlling such communications and checking for violations are part of the research. 
6 The experimenter chose one of the 10 letters at random as the state of nature. Given the state, a distribution fletters 
was created with the state having a probability of 1/4 and each of the other nine states a probability V12. Each subject 
was then given a sample of three independent draws from this second distribution. If the sample contains three separate 
letters, the probability of the state given the sample is 0.188 for each letter in the sample and .063 for each letter not 
in the sample. If one letter is drawn twice, its probability goes up to 0.45 as opposed to 0.15 for the other drawn letter 
and 0.05 for each letter not drawn. If one letter is drawn three times, the probability that letter is the state is 0.75 as 
opposed to 0.028 for each of the others. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 17:18:04 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
12 Charles R. Plott 
information, so the price of certificate corresponding to the state should be near 200 and the 
price of all others near 0. In the first wo periods, it is difficult to determine from the figure 
whether the market of the true state is emerging with a higher price than the other markets. 
However, by period 3 the correct market begins to emerge very early, and in periods 4, 5, and 
6 the market with the correct state emerges trongly after only a few trades. An exciting event 
occurs in period 7, when the market hat approaches 200 very early is actually the wrong state. 
However, the market itself seems to broadcast hat something is wrong because a second market 
(the correct state) also emerges with a high price. Of course, with two states with high prices, 
substantial arbitrage possibilities existed, but these were not immediately competed away. In 
the final period, a wrong market also emerges early, but it is "beat down," and the true state 
becomes identified. 
3. Do Such Theories and Experiments Have Uses? 
If markets have the power to collect and to aggregate information, then harnessing that 
power could be valuable. Explorations of the possibilities have resulted in the creation of special 
markets or processes that have no use other than as information aggregation devices. Indeed, 
if the principles of economics are reliable, then such exercises in invention should be possible. 
Consider the following problem. A company wants to know the level of sales in some 
product some months in the future. It feels that the best information regarding the state of the 
market resides dispersed as opinions, hunches, and beliefs in its sales force. It is the sales force 
that meets the customers and has the most recent experience regarding demand. While any 
particular salesperson might have very little information, the collection of salespeople might 
have considerable knowledge. However, it must be collected and organized. If collected and 
organized, it might become enhanced by the process because an individual salesperson might 
want to reevaluate private information i the light of the opinions of others. 
Figure 7 reproduces the screen from a test of information aggregation that ook place inside 
a business a few years ago. The issue was whether a market mechanism could be used to collect 
and aggregate information that was thought to be held remotely as intuitions and hunches by 
individuals cattered across the organization. 
Ten markets were created and operated only within the company using electronic markets 
created within the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science. The 
markets were labeled SEP-LOW-000-1500, SEP-LOW-1501-1600, SEP-LOW-1601-1700, and 
so on. If the upcoming September sales of the item were to fall in the interval 0-1500, then 
the market with that label would pay $1.00 per share to the owner of the shares, and all other 
markets would pay nothing. If the upcoming September sales of the item were to fall in the 
interval 1501-1600, then the market with that label would pay $1.00 per share to the owner of 
the shares, and all other markets would pay nothing and so on. As can be seen, the structure 
of this market system is exactly the same as that represented in Figure 6, only the states of 
nature are different, the subjects are different, and the time scale is different. 
Each person who was allowed to participate was given an endowment of approximately 
20 shares in each of the markets. The markets were open for several days, during which par- 
ticipants could buy and sell shares reflecting their beliefs about what the likely level of sales 
might be. The question posed was whether the market prices would reflect he relative proba- 
bilities of the actual sales. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 17:18:04 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Distinguished Guest Lecture 13 
Markets are Closed until October, see theAnnouncements. 
MARKET SUMMARY September Low Markets ID: 1 Wed Apr 28 18:15:25 1999 RELOAD 
Please Select Markets: September-Low All 
Your Best Buy test Sell Last My My Order Form 
Market Shares Offer Offer Trade Offers Trades Graph History r Buy r Sell SEP-LOW-0000-1500 0 10 57 5@9 9 -1- 9 9 Market SEP-LOW-1501-1600  5@10 20@24 10 -1- 0 0 nits: f Price: 
. SEP-LOW-1601-1700 5@14 10@25 14 -/- 
0 0 
to SEP-LOW-1701-1800 0 5@11 10@30 11 * * * imetoExpire: 0 
SEP-LOW-1801-1900  20@7 10@39 11 -- 0 * 9 (e0g lh6ms; O=never expire) 
SEP-LOW-1901-2000 5@22 10@28 22 -1 0 * 0 9 w 
SEP-LOW-2001-2100 10@11 10@45 18 -4- 0 * O 
SEP-LOW-2101-2200 0 10@10 10@30 15 -1- O 0 0 
SEP-LOW-2201-2300 0 8@5 2@14 14 -1- * * O 
SEP-LOW-2301-more 0 7~j1 
10.17 
1 -1- * 0 * 
Your cash on hand is: 0 Home Instructions and Help Announcements, Last Sep11,10:00 AM LOGOUT 
Data Advanced Orders Graph of All September Low Markets Inventory Personal Trade History 
Figure 7. Arrow Debreu Markets Used to Collect Information Distributed Within a Business Enterprise 
Figure 7 reflects the state of the system at the end of all trading sessions. For each market, 
the bid, ask, and last trade are shown. Links to take the traders to history are there, as is the 
bid form. Since the prices must range from 0 to 100, they can be interpreted as probabilities. 
Thus, the price of 9 in the market SEP-LOW-000-1500 can be interpreted as the "market belief" 
that the probability is 0.09 that the September sales will be in the range 0-1500. With the 
interpretation of prices as probabilities, the modal state is 1901-2100 with a probability of 0.22, 
and the distribution seems to be skewed upward from there. 
How does this particular information aggregation mechanism perform? The exercise was 
conducted 16 times inside the company, and the mean state was never further from the actual 
sales than was the official prediction and was significantly closer in all but one. All indications 
are that this type of mechanism works in practice. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In essence, this talk is really two talks. One is the topic, and another deals with substance. 
The topic of the talk posed questions about the capacity of markets to gather information 
distributed across a system in the form of beliefs, hunches, and opinions; aggregate the infor- 
mation like a statistician; and then publish it for all to see. Stated in that form, it is a rather 
challenging task. The answer to the questions is "yes," markets really can perform such tasks. 
The substance of the talk dealt with a deeper question about how one would know the 
answer to the questions posed by the topic. The tools were experiments that exposed the prin- 
ciples involved and provided the machinery needed to develop judgments about how robust he 
phenomena might be. Experiments tell us that the ability of markets to perform the task of 
information aggregation is closely related to the dynamics that take place in market adjustments. 
Furthermore, that dynamic is itself closely related to the way that markets are organized and 
the instruments hat exist in the markets for trading. Some modes of organization and some 
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instruments do not lead to reliable information, while others clearly do a better job. While we 
do not have a complete theory for explaining what we see, we do have very powerful models 
that are helpful and suggestive. 
The combination of theory and experiments lead naturally to a new class of issue to 
challenge the profession. Can we design competitive-type processes for the explicit purpose of 
collecting information? These can be called information aggregation mechanisms. Once de- 
signed, can they be tested in the laboratory? Can they be deployed under field conditions? Do 
they work once deployed? 
The answer to all the questions is "yes." Examples of explicit designs and experimental 
tests are given in the body of the talk, but more evidence exists. Experiments exist with types 
of information aggregation mechanisms that are not directly market processes (Plott, Wit, and 
Yang 1997). There are also information aggregation mechanisms that have been implemented 
without direct testing but that have an amazing ability to perform (Forsythe et al. 1992; Berg, 
Forsythe, and Rietz 1996; Forsythe, Rietz, and Ross 1999). Given the complexity of the task, 
the progress is impressive. It is hoped that as the profession realizes the power that it has in 
theory and the ability of experiments to help refine that theory as needed for field implemen- 
tation, we will see even more progress. 
References 
Anderson, Lisa R., and Charles A. Holt. 1997. Information cascades in the laboratory. American Economic Review 87: 
847-62. 
Berg, Joyce, Robert Forsythe, and Thomas A. Rietz. 1996. What makes markets predict well? Evidence from the Iowa 
electric markets. In Understanding strategic interaction: Essays in honor of Reinhard Selten, edited by W Albers, 
W Gtith, P. Hammerstein, B. Moldovanu, and E. Van Damme. New York: Springer, pp. 444-63. 
Brewer, Paul J., Maria Huang, Brad Nelson, and Charles R. Plott. 1999. Behavioral foundations of the law of supply and 
demand: Human convergence and robot randomness. Social Science Working Paper No. 1079, California Institute 
of Technology. 
Camerer, Colin E, and Keith Weigelt. 1991. Information mirages in experimental asset markets. Journal of Business 64: 
463-93. 
Cason, Timothy N., and Daniel Friedman. 1993. An empirical analysis of price formation i double auction markets. In 
The double auction market: Institutions, theories, and evidence, edited by D. Friedman and J. Rust. Reading, 
MA: Addison-Wesley, pp. 253-83. 
Cason, Timothy N., and Daniel Friedman. 1996. Price formation i double auction markets. Journal of Economic Dy- 
namics and Control 20:1307-37. 
Copeland, Thomas, and Daniel Friedman. 1987. The effect of sequential information arrival on asset prices: An experi- 
mental study. Journal of Finance 42:763-97. 
Copeland, Thomas, and Daniel Friedman. 1991. Partial revelation of information i experimental asset markets. Journal 
of Finance 46:265-95. 
Copeland, Thomas, and Daniel Friedman. 1992. The market value of information: Some experimental results. Journal 
of Business 65:241-66. 
Dyer, Douglas, John H. Kagel, and Dan Levin. 1989. A comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value 
offer auctions: A laboratory analysis. Economic Journal 99:108-15. 
Easley, David, and John O. Ledyard. 1993. Theories of price formation and exchange in double oral auctions. In The 
double auction market: Institutions, theories and evidence, edited by Daniel Friedman and John Rust. Reading, 
MA: Addison-Wesley, pp. 63-98. 
Fisher, Eric O'N., and Frank S. Kelly. 2000. Experimental foreign exchange markets. Pacific Economic Review. In press. 
Forsythe, Robert, and Russell Lundholm. 1990. Information aggregation in an experimental market. Econometrica 58: 
309-47. 
Forsythe, Robert, Forrest Nelson, George Neumann, and Jack Wright. 1992. Anatomy of an experimental political stock 
market. American Economic Review 82:1142-61. 
Forsythe, Robert, Thomas A. Rietz, and Thomas W Ross. 1999. Wishes, expectations and actions: A survey on price 
formation i election stock markets. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 39:83-110. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 17:18:04 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Distinguished Guest Lecture 15 
Friedman, Daniel. 1991. A simple testable model of double auction markets. Journal of Economic Behavior and Or- 
ganization 15:47-70. 
Gjerstad, Steven, and John Dickhaut. 1995. Price formation i double auctions. Games and Economic Behavior 22:1-29. 
Gode, Dhananjay K., and Shyam Sunder. 1993. Allocative efficiency of markets with zero-intelligence traders: Market 
as a partial substitute for individual rationality. Journal of Political Economy 101:119-37. 
Gode, Dhananjay K., and Shyam Sunder. 1997. What makes markets allocatively efficient. Quarterly Journal of Eco- 
nomics 112(2):603-30. 
Goodfellow, Jessica, and Charles R. Plott. 1990. An experimental examination of the simultaneous determination f input 
prices and output prices. Southern Economic Journal 56:969-83. 
Jamison, Julian C., and Charles R. Plott. 1997. Costly offers and equilibration properties of the multiple unit double 
auction under conditions of unpredictable shifts of demand and supply. Journal of Economic Behavior and Or- 
ganization 32(4):591-612. 
Kagel, John H., and Dan Levin. 1986. The winner's curse and public information i common value auctions. American 
Economic Review 76:894-920. 
King, Ronald R., Vernon L. Smith, Arlington W. Williams, and Mark V. Van Boening. 1993. The robustness of bubbles 
and crashes in experimental stock markets. In Nonlinear dynamics and evolutionary economics, edited by I. 
Prigogine, R. Day, and P Chen. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 183-200. 
Lei, Vivian, Charles N. Noussair, and Charles R. Plott. 2000. Non-speculative bubbles in experimental asset markets: 
Lack of common knowledge of rationality vs. actual irrationality. Econometrica. In press. 
Lian, Peng, and Charles R. Plott. 1998. General equilibrium, markets, macroeconomics and money in a laboratory 
experimental environment. Economic Theory 12(1):21-75. 
Lind, Barry, and Charles R. Plott. 1991. The winner's curse: Experiments with buyers and with sellers. American Eco- 
nomic Review 81(1):335-46. 
Ni5th, Markus, and Martin Weber. 1996. Insider detection in experimental asset markets. Working Paper No. 96-05, 
Lehrstiihle fiir Finanwirtschaft, Universitdit Mannheim. 
Noussair, Charles N., Charles R. Plott, and Raymond G. Riezman. 1995. An experimental investigation of the patterns 
of international trade. American Economic Review 85(3):462-91. 
Noussair, Charles N., Charles R. Plott, and Raymond G. Riezman. 1997. The principles of exchange rate determination 
in an international finance experiment. Journal of Political Economy 105(4):822-61. 
Plott, Charles R. 2000. Market stability: Backward bending supply in a laboratory market. Economic Inquiry 38(1):1-18. 
Plott, Charles R., and Jared Smith. 1999. Instability of equilibria in experimental markets: Upward-sloping demands, 
externalities and fad-like incentives. Southern Economic Journal 65:405-26. 
Plott, Charles R., and Shyam Sunder. 1982. Efficiency of experimental security markets with insider information: An 
application of rational expectations models. Journal of Political Economy 90:663-98. 
Plott, Charles R., and Shyam Sunder. 1988. Rational expectations and the aggregation of diverse information i a labo- 
ratory security markets. Econometrica 56:1085-118. 
Plott, Charles R., Jjrgen Wit, and Winston C. Yang. 1997. Parimutuel betting markets as information aggregation devices: 
Experimental results. Social Science Working Paper No. 986, California Institute of Technology. 
Porter, David P, and Vernon L. Smith. 1994. Stock market bubbles in the laboratory. Applied Mathematical Finance 1: 
111-27. 
Porter, David P., and Vernon L. Smith. 1995. Futures contracting and dividend uncertainty in experimental asset markets. 
Journal of Business 68(4):509-41. 
Smith, Vernon L., Gerry L. Suchanek, and Arlington W. Williams. 1988. Bubbles, crashes and endogenous expectations 
in experimental spot asset markets. Econometrica 56:1119-51. 
Sunder, Shyam..1992. Market for information: Experimental evidence. Econometrica 60:667-95. 
Sunder, Shyam. 1995. Experimental asset markets: A survey. In Handbook of experimental economics, edited by John 
H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 445-500. 
Turocy, Theodore L. III, and Charles R. Plott. 1996. Intertemporal speculation under uncertain future demand: Experi- 
mental results. Understanding strategic interaction: Essays in honor of Reinhard Selten, edited by W. Albers, W. 
Giith, P Hammerstein, B. Moldovanu, and E. Van Damme. Berlin: Springer, pp. 475-93. 
Van Boening, Mark V., Arlington W. Williams, and S. LeMaster. 1993. Price bubbles and crashes in experimental call 
markets. Economics Letters 41:179-85. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 17:18:04 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
